Individual climate justice duties

Individual Climate Justice Duties: The Cooperative Promotional Model & Its Challenges[1]

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Let us start with the assumption that the global elite should act together to secure climate change mitigation and adaptation, at least to the extent of protecting fundamental human interests. By the 'global elite' I mean most people in more developed countries and the rich minority in less developed ones. This claim has been defended philosophically as a shared or 'weakly collective' duty or as the putative duty of a putative group: a duty to organize as necessary to achieve some collective result (Cripps 2013: 48-82; Isaacs 2011: 144-53). This chapter asks what it means for individuals.[2]

It is frequently claimed that individuals should promote collective climate action (Johnson 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). I have elsewhere defended this as the individual's primary climate justice duty, on the basis of fairness, efficiency and effectiveness (Cripps 2013: 140-55).[3] However, this leaves the individual little the wiser as to what she should actually *do*. Her options range from what we might call 'pure' promotional actions, designed to bring about institutional change – voting, campaigning, marching, starting and signing petitions, writing to politicians, writing in newspapers, and so on – to lifestyle changes as part of wider movements, such as veganism, or investing in renewable technology. One individual cannot do everything. So how does she choose?

This chapter both defends and challenges my response to this: the Cooperative Promotional Model (CPM).[4] It understands promotional duties in a broad sense (beyond merely promoting governmental action) and accounts not only for a duty to perform 'pure' promotional actions (such as campaigning or voting) but also to cut one's own carbon footprint. Having outlined the model and set it in philosophical context, the chapter will

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[1] Earlier versions of this argument were discussed at the Moral Philosophy Seminar, University of Oxford, the Climate Justice Beyond the State Workshop, University of New South Wales, the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, University of St Andrew, the Political Theory Colloquium, Goethe University, Frankfurt and the Edinburgh University Political Theory Group. I gratefully acknowledge the constructive feedback on all occasions, as well as helpful comments from the editors of this volume.

[2] Were a fair, efficient, effective collective scheme in place to fulfil the shared or weakly collective duty, each individual should (obviously) play her part. But this is not the case.

[3] See Cripps (2013: 115-39; Forthcoming) for my rejection of a number of arguments for a priority-taking duty to minimise one's own carbon footprint (individual harm, fairness, Kantian or virtue ethic-based). I previously distinguished between mimicking, direct and promotional duties (Cripps 2013: 116). Here, the three are subsumed within the overall promotional end.

[4] For an introduction to this model for a broader audience, see Cripps (Forthcoming).

highlight three key challenges and indicate briefly why a modified CPM is worth pursuing despite these.

Introducing the Cooperative Promotional Model

The CPM requires individuals to fulfil the following duty. I present it here in a preliminary format; by the end of the chapter, a slight adjustment will have become necessary.

Cooperative Promotional Duty (CPD)

Act together with motivated others, so far as possible at reasonable cost to oneself, to promote fair, efficient, effective global-level progress on climate change mitigation and adaptation.

I will return later to the 'reasonable cost' condition. 'Acting together' is intended to include a range of possibilities: strongly collective action via some institutional structure, less formal joint or collective action (with each individual thinking of herself as contributing to a collective result), or reliable coordination. A small-scale rescue case can provide illustration. A number of experienced climbers approaching several tourists in need of rescue across a hillside might be the local mountain rescue group following an established collective decision-making process or they might be a collection of individuals not previously constituting a group. In the latter case, they might act intentionally together by deliberating and determining between them who will rescue each, *or* they might coordinate in some mutually obvious way without the need for prior discussion (for example, each rescuing the person closest to her).

In the climate change case, the situation is complicated by the global-level nature of the challenge. Two distinctions must be drawn. The first is between the global elite taken as a whole, who incur the shared or weakly collective duty, and the subset actually motivated to fulfil it, whom we can call The Motivated. Note that this model focuses on the duty to co-operate with other motivated agents but does not thereby assume that the long-term collective scheme will involve only The Motivated. Quite the contrary, since this would be unfair. I will return to this point.

It is not currently feasible for The Motivated to act *as a* collective. The group has global span, but overlaps with states and institutions (rather than neatly encompassing them) and has no decision-making structure of its own. Nor is it feasible for an individual to facilitate such collective action alone.[5] Thus, applying the CPM requires drawing a second distinction: between The Motivated as a whole and the many smaller motivated groups or potential groups ((P)SMGs) within it who are or could easily become capable of collective action. These range from small, often informal collections of individuals through to bigger scale movements, such as the vegan movement, or more or less formally structured collectives, such as NGOs. Achieving progress on fair, efficient, effective mitigation and adaptation will involve more or less strongly collective action by these (P)SMGs and more or less reliable coordination across them.

Against this background, there are four steps to fulfilling the CPD.

[5] Barring, possibly, some exceptionally situated or talented individuals, whom I will exclude for the purposes of this chapter.

Step 1

The individual must establish what effective coordination and distribution of individual contributions across the different (P)SMGs would look like. This depends on the chances of success of each effort (that is, whether each group achieves its own end), and how they fit with one another in terms of the overall aim (which, recall, is taken to be fair, efficient, effective global level progress on mitigation and adaptation).

With regard to the latter, the actions of different (P)SMGs can be complementary or the reverse. They can be complementary in the straightforward sense of focusing on different aspects of the challenge, for example developing renewable or adaptation technology, or pursuing either institutional or widespread lifestyle change. However, they can also be complementary in a different sense: keeping different options open while it remains unclear which has the potential to succeed. For example, different technologies might be simultaneously researched or different political options explored, evaluated and promoted.

However, there might be insufficient resources to pursue or promote all these possibilities adequately. Then, the activities of different (P)SMGs could conflict and, in combination, set back the overall end of fair, effective, efficient global progress. Suppose, for example, there are insufficient resources adequately to promote two major adaptation projects. Conflict can also arise more directly between the goals of different (P)SMGs, even if all are ultimately concerned with climate justice. Compare 'sustainable intensification' (Budolfson 2018) with organic, wildlife-friendly agriculture combined with much lower meat and dairy consumption.[6] There is a fine line between different groups pursuing different options complementarily (as it is not yet clear which is most feasible) and actively campaigning against one another in a way which risks setting back the overall end. Moreover, previously complementary subgroups might come into conflict as further evidence about feasibility emerges, or the demand for resources increases. All this is important to calculating how different (P)SMG efforts can optimally combine, but also generates potential challenges for the model, to which I will return.

Step 2

The individual must then ascertain where to devote her own effort, depending on the following factors:

- *Her own skillset and that of other motivated individuals.*
- *The costs to herself and to motivated others of acting within different (P)SMGs.* This is relevant because of the reasonable cost threshold: the costs of different potential cooperative actions will determine how much an individual is able to contribute before reaching that threshold, and so where she can be most effective.
- *Her own position and influence, and that of motivated others*.[7] This is not just about occupying certain political or institutional roles, although that is important: the actions of the US president, the Pope or the CEO of a FTSE 100 company are more likely to bring about political change or the actions of others than those of most individuals. It is about influence in more general terms. Consider for example the potential for celebrities to

[6] It might be contended that 'sustainable intensification' cannot be a genuine part of pursuit of climate justice because it is an oxymoron. However, I set this aside for the purposes of the example.

[7] For an earlier discussion see Cripps (2013: 162-64).

promote social or even political change.[8] The point is simply that more effort is necessarily required of these individuals (though it might be of political or corporate leaders, because of the special liability of certain institutions for harm). Rather, more might be achieved in certain areas by certain individuals at an equivalent level of personal cost.

- *The needs and salience of needs of different (P)SMGs.* This follows from Step 1.

Step 3

Having worked out the optimum allocation of effort across the different (P)SMGs, the next step for the individual is to estimate and adjust for likely deviation from that optimum allocation by other motivated individuals. This might result from bias towards certain (perhaps local) ends or inadequate ability to communicate, acquire knowledge, or coordinate optimally.

Step 4

Finally, the individual is required to be flexible. This is not some one-off decision to which she afterwards unwaveringly adheres. Rather, she must adjust her behaviour and her cooperative actions as either the facts or her awareness of them changes. For example, it might become apparent that one option is technically infeasible or another has the momentum to succeed.

To illustrate the process, consider the following analogy:

Islanders

50 people are stranded on a small island where a dangerous storm is reliably forecast for the next day. They have no adequate boats. Another 20 people are on the mainland in a position to attempt a rescue. All are motivated to help. This might be approached in two ways:
R1. Using one big boat. This is most likely to be effective but will not be possible in certain (unlikely but possible) weather conditions.
R2. Using several smaller boats. This is riskier and less likely to succeed but is the only option in the above weather conditions.

Step 1 is for the individual to work out how the different subsets within Mainlanders could most fairly and efficiently coordinate for the rescue. Some might focus on different aspects of preparing for the rescue: equipping the boat(s), preparing to act as crew, and so on. If there are sufficient Mainlanders and resources to prepare for R1 and R2, a subgroup should focus on each, reliably coordinating to keep both options open. If this is not the case, two rival groups each pursuing one of the two options would be collectively irrational.

In Step 2, the individual estimates where she and others best fit in this effort, according to the needs of the different (P)SMGs, as well as her skills and those of others (are they experienced sailors or trained engineers?), her/their position or influence (is she particularly popular, or valued as a leader in some other sphere?), and the costs of taking on different roles. (At the extreme, it might be unreasonably demanding for a breastfeeding mother or someone suffering from acute sea-sickness to take active part in the rescue.) However, communication difficulties or widespread bias among others might mean that an individual should deviate from the allocation implied by (1) and (2) in order to contribute most

[8] Actor-activists Emma Thompson and Leonardo di Caprio are obvious examples. UK Premier League footballer Hector Bellerin also recently used a radio interview to highlight the importance of action on climate change (BBC 2019).

effectively to the overall end (Step 3). Suppose there is no time for a formal decision making process to assign some Mainlanders to R1 and others for R2, but it would be optimal to prepare for both. An individual whose own skills would best fit her for mending and preparing the big boat might see that most others are gravitating that way, and instead prepare to crew a small boat.

The last step is for the individual to adjust to changes. For example, if the weather becomes clearly settled for long enough to use the big boat, the individual would shift her efforts from preparing for R2, to helping to bring about R1 as quickly as possible.

Philosophical context

Having outlined the CPM, I have now to provide a normative justification for it. As noted above, this chapter assumes a shared or weakly collective duty or, as it has alternatively been defended, a putative duty of a putative group (Cripps 2013: 48-82; Isaacs 2011: 144-53). This is a duty to act together as necessary to prevent climate change from undermining central human interests. It has been defended as a positive duty, grounded in a collectivised principle of beneficence, a duty to organize to secure basic rights, or a duty to protect the vulnerable (Cripps 2013; Held 1970; Shue 1980). It has also been defended as a negative duty to act together to prevent the harm resulting predictably from the combination of individual actions or from participation in harmful patterns of action (Ashford 2006; Cripps 2013; Gardiner 2011b; Kutz 2000). In each case, there is moral reason for some group or potential group to achieve something together and this gives rise to individual reasons to act, including to promote collective-level progress (Isaacs 2011: 140-54). The duty to render any collective action *fair* and *efficient* is grounded separately in obligations to one's fellow duty-bearers (Cripps 2013: 143-50).

Given the focus on *promoting* a particular state of affairs, the natural justification for an individual's course of action would be a consequentialist one (Pettit 1991: 340).[9] However, the CPM by no means corresponds to a straightforward maximising consequentialism, and certainly does not collapse into utilitarianism. The moral salience of the outcome being pursued – fair, efficient, effective global-level climate change mitigation and adaptation – is ultimately grounded in the normative priority of protecting basic rights or interests. Moreover, the CPM incorporates a demandingness limit in terms of individual costs and relationships, and is compatible with some deontological constraints. A later section will elaborate on this.

With these caveats in mind, let me turn to the *version* of consequentialist reasoning underlying the CPM. Simple rule-consequentialism will not justify the CPD, because of the partial compliance objection. In this context, the individual rule-consequentialist would calculate what all duty-bearers should be doing and play what would be her own part in that. However, individuals know that many unmotivated persons and groups in the global elite won't do their part (call these The Unmotivated). Accordingly, it would better promote global climate action if The Motivated attempted to motivate others, or 'took up the slack' by doing more themselves, than if they attempted to contribute to a combination of actions which will

[9] To put it another way, I am effectively recommending that those motivated by collective harm or beneficence considerations should 'think like consequentialists'. This is in contrast to Dale Jamieson (2010) who argues that rule-consequentialists should make themselves think like virtue theorists (to motivate themselves to 'go green'). For my critique of his argument, see Cripps (2013: 124-27).

not in fact be forthcoming. The CPM bypasses this problem by focusing on what individuals can achieve by acting together with *motivated* others. (To reiterate, in drawing this distinction between The Motivated and all duty bearers, I am not assuming that in any long-term global level collective action The Motivated, taken as a whole, must pick up all the slack. I will come back to this.)

An alternative consequentialist approach, avoiding the partial compliance objection, would be a modified rule consequentialist reasoning on which the individual calculates how everyone in The Motivated should act to secure the overall result and does her 'bit' of that. However, this also fails to justify the CPD, for two reasons. Firstly, unlike the CPM, this approach neglects the possibility that those who *want* to contribute optimally to combined and collective action might fail to do so effectively. This could result from communication issues, lack of mutual knowledge, or bias by some motivated individuals.[10] For example, individuals might tend towards projects local to themselves, even if these are less central to the overall goal. Given all this, it could be more effective for the individual to cooperate with some others to compensate for likely deviations.

Secondly, any viable model of individual climate duties must make space for strongly collective action or fail to capture all viable and necessary means of achieving progress. Consider the difference between combined emissions cuts resulting in mitigation gains and the development of (say) a global adaptation fund, which requires strongly collective action. (Even in the former instance, strongly collective action will often be fairer and more efficient (Cripps 2013: 143-50).) The CPM allows explicitly for cases in which the best course of action requires acting intentionally *as a* collective. However, in such cases it becomes impossible or pointless simply to 'do one's part' acting *as an* isolated individual.

Clearly, then, the CPM can only be grounded by a model on which what it is right for an individual to do depends partly on how others act in cooperative situations; which makes space for more or less strongly collective action rather than simply coordination or combination of individual actions; and which adjusts for failure by even motivated others to act according to the optimal scheme. The obvious question is then: is the CPM justified by act-consequentialist reasoning?

The answer is less obvious: it can be, but needn't. In fact, progress can be made on justifying the CPM by considering alternative ways of responding to an important challenge to the idea of individual promotional duties (or individual consequentialism more generally). This is the no difference challenge. While it is clear what we should do as a collective and clear that *if* there were a collective-level response to be part of, the collective duty could indeed mediate individual duties, the situation is relevantly different (or so the objection goes) when there is no duty-fulfilling collective-level scheme.[11] Whether via 'pure' promotional activities such as voting or marching or cutting individual emissions (to which I will return below), an

[10] There is evidence of bias in terms of environmental goals more general, for example the tendency to care disproportionately about the fate of 'cute' species in protecting biodiversity (Small 2011, 2012).

[11] It is important to distinguish between the collective level, where the moral argument can be backwards or forwards-looking, and individual level. Mediated by the collective obligation, the individual has a forward-looking or indirect reason to pursue collective progress on climate change, via subset endeavours. Thus, the puzzle is the familiar one of making sense of why an individual should add her effort to a worthwhile group effort where it will make no (perceptible) difference (as with, for example, Derek Parfit's Principle of Group Beneficence (1984: 76-83)).

individual's actions will make no difference to whether global-level progress is made on climate change mitigation or adaptation.[12]

One response to this appeals to *expected consequence* reasoning: to the chance of one's individual contribution triggering a significant collective-level change (Broome 2019; Hiller 2011; Kagan 2011). In terms of individual emissions cuts, the idea is that there are thresholds of emissions at which harms get worse, and the individual, in emitting, runs the risk of causing such a threshold to be cut. More generally, the point is that an individual's actions have a non-trivial probability of causing the global elite more closely to approximate fulfilment of its collective duties. On this interpretation, act-consequentialist reasoning justifies the CPD. Calculating what action would have the best expected consequences, in terms of bringing about fair, effective, efficient action on climate change, would require completing steps (1) to (4) above.[13]

However, it remains contested whether there are collective action cases where threshold reasoning does not apply, and whether the climate case is one of these (Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong 2018: 178-81; Nefsky 2011). If so, an alternative justification for the CPD can be found in a recent account which detaches causal significance from difference-making (Nefsky 2017). On this, an individual has moral reason to contribute to some combined or collective effort so long as the following hold: it remains uncertain whether the worthwhile outcome will be achieved, part of what determines whether or not it will be achieved is whether enough individuals act in the way the individual is considering acting, and it is still uncertain whether enough individuals will so act. The individual would thus be a non-superfluous part of the cause of a worthwhile event. To put it another way, she would *help* to bring it about.

If this argument convinces, individuals can have moral reason to act in non-threshold collective action cases. But that does not make it a moral *duty* to do so (Nefsky 2017: 2744-45). There are many such potential endeavours from which an individual could choose, even in the context of promoting fair, efficient, efficient collective action on climate change. The CPM fills out the process of choosing between them, according to the moral salience of the different aims, the relative salience of their need for the individual's type of actions and their likelihood of being under or oversubscribed.[14] The point is not to reduce this to expected consequence calculation: rather the individual is motivated by being part of the 'herself-and-others' who could, for example, rectify the balance given general deviation from optimal coordination.

I doubt whether this can be called 'act-consequentialism'. Indeed, an advantage of this model –one particularly suited to the CPM – is that it is designed for determining long-term individual *patterns* of action and does not require the individual to assess each act on a case by case basis (Nefsky 2017: 2765). However, what ultimately matters is not whether the CPM can be fitted into a particular terminology but whether it can be justified philosophically, within broader moral framework with which this chapter began. This I hope to have demonstrated.

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[12] That is not to say that the objection is equally strong with respect to 'pure' promotional actions (Cripps 2013: 147).

[13] On this reading, (2) and (3) might be combined into a single step: effectively, the individual works out how she could best approximate the combination of actions identified in step (1), and so optimally bring about progress on climate change given the likely errors of motivated others.

[14] An alternative moral reason for participating in collective action is fairness-based: the individual should avoid seeking to make an exception of herself, equivalent to free riding in collective self-interest cases (Cullity 2019). However, the individual still needs to determine which collective efforts are most morally salient and which she has a *duty* to be part of.

Individual emissions cuts

With this in mind, let us briefly consider how fulfilling the CPD might involve cutting one's own carbon footprint. This both acts as an example of the CPD in action, and demonstrates how the model can incorporate the individual emissions cuts which are sometimes consistent as entirely separate, and potentially rival, to so-called 'pure' promotional duties.

Firstly, emissions cuts can play a promotional role, especially if they are made as part of a collective effort with motivated others. They can enhance the progress of social movements, for example the vegan movement, by incentivizing others to reduce their own carbon footprint. They can also serve to promote institutional change, either via social impetus or by acting as a 'signal' of willingness to accept regulatory change (Lawford-Smith 2016). Secondly, coordinated or collective actions to reduce emissions through combined lifestyle choices can, at a big enough scale, contribute to mitigation. Individuals can be part of this.

There is an apparent tension between signaling for institutional change and for social movement change, which makes it more likely that the latter will be required by the CPD. It has been argued that an individual 'signal' must come at significant cost if it is to be taken as a meaningful guarantee of willingness to accept institutional changes such as higher prices for fossil fuels (Lawford-Smith 2016: 324-25). Such costly changes may be unreasonably demanding for some. However, lifestyle changes (such as becoming vegan, cycling, or holidaying by train) are more likely to be imitated by other *individuals* if they are presented as *low* cost, even beneficial or enjoyable.[15] Since some 'green' lifestyle choices are arguably beneficial to the individuals themselves, they could play this role in promoting social movements, all the within an SMG of signalers. Moreover, even such low-cost changes could promote, if not top-down political change, at least some institutional change at an arguably equally influential level: corporate and economic change. This in turn can promote further lifestyle changes, as any individual costs of doing so fall. (Consider how plant-based products have become increasingly available as the number of vegans and flexitarians increase, in turn facilitating a further lifestyle shift (Hancox 2018).)

Finally, thinking purely in terms of contribution to the harm done by climate change – rather than participating in combined or collective action to *prevent* such harm – one's individual emissions arguably have some moral significance. However, the reasons for such cuts (whether rationalized in terms of expected consequences or helping to reduce harm) must be weighed up against other possible consequences available through cooperative action within the limits of demandingness (Cripps Forthcoming).

Demandingness

As I have stressed, the CPM is not consequentialist 'all the way down'. The duties it entails are *pro tanto*. The CPD also incorporates a demandingness limit. This section will briefly elaborate on both of these considerations.

[15]A study of another environmentally beneficial diet change (eating insects) found that neither the environmental benefits nor the health benefits were as persuasive as taste or trendiness (Berger et al. 2018).

Firstly, fulfilment could permissibly be constrained by some other moral duties, for example the individual no-harm principle or certain special duties, such as the to care for one's severely disabled partner.[16] Fulfilling the CPD might also come into conflict with other duties of global justice, such as aiding the current poor. I acknowledge this whilst leaving open either of two possible responses: allowing for such duties to take priority sometimes, for some individuals, *or* widening the scope of the CPM to apply to global justice more generally. The individual would use the four-step process to determine where to allocate her own efforts within that broader context. However, given the urgency and pervasiveness of the climate emergency, mitigation and adaptation would still be salient collective aims.[17]

Secondly, the CPD's 'reasonable cost' condition limits the sacrifices an individual can be expected to make, in terms of her own interests, projects and relationships. Broadly interpreted, this also would rule out some negative impacts on those closest to the individual, such as her children. I have not specified what the demandingness threshold is and cannot do more, here, than gesture in that direction. However, one reasonable line of thought starts from the widely shared moral principles governing individual action: the no-harm principle and the principle of beneficence (Mill 1859: 14; Singer 1972: 231). Given the anthropogenic nature of climate change, perhaps individual climate justice duties should be considered in line with the former, thereby putting the 'reasonable cost' threshold very high (Broome 2012: 57; Cripps 2013: 11-12). However, this is disputed (Cripps 2013: 157; Fragniere 2018). Even if the stringent demandingness threshold applied in instances of strongly collective harm, there is a morally relevant difference in control between cases where the actions of individuals aggregate predictably to cause serious harm, and those where a group is acting intentionally *as a group* (that is, as a moral agent in its own right), with harm a foreseeable consequence.

One might turn instead to the CPD as positively derived and so to the notion of 'significant cost', borrowed from the moderate principle of beneficence (Singer 1972: 231). I have elsewhere interpreted this as serious, even if temporary, interference with a central human interest (Cripps 2013: 13-14). This would, for example, rule out an individual having to take on a debilitating but temporary illness, break a leg, or be separated even for a few weeks from their young children.

I do not think this can be rejected as too stringent. As in the negative case, appeal might be made to the difference between individual beneficence cases (for example, 'Anne can pull Bob out of the water at relatively low cost to herself') and cases such as this one, where the individual does not have sufficient control over the situation to be sure of bringing about the desired result. However, in the context of positive duties it would be a mistake to assume that *less* sacrifice is required of individuals simply because of the capacity for action (or inaction) by others. There is not space to go into the interesting and important questions around partial compliance and slack-taking here, so I will simply refer to one compelling recent argument (Karnein 2014), according to which the behaviour of other duty-bearers can change the *content* of an individual's duty, but not the demandingness limit. Indeed, up to that limit, an individual might be required to do *more* than she would otherwise have done because of the failure of others to act.

So far, so reasonable. However, this remains an undertheorized area in climate ethics (one, moreover, in need of interdisciplinary input). For example, one might question whether extrapolating from small-scale principles is the right way to assess demandingness at all, in

[16] I have elsewhere elsewhere rejected the view that individual harm reasoning gives a direct, priority-taking individual duty to eliminate one's own carbon footprint (Cripps 2016, Forthcoming).

[17] See also Cripps (Forthcoming).

the face of the climate emergency. Given extreme global and intergenerational urgency, perhaps climate justice duties are radically more demanding than I have suggested: more akin to what individuals have previously been expected to sacrifice in a national emergency such as war.

It is sufficient to leave the issue open for the purposes of this chapter, with the placeholder above provisionally in place. Even if individuals only had a duty to promote climate justice up to the point of fairly modest sacrifice (Fragniere 2018), they would need a way of deciding what to do up to that limit. The CPM provides that. The same would apply if the duties were much *more* demanding than I have suggested. Moreover, even a low threshold for demandingness would require a great deal more of affluent individuals than most of us currently achieve.

Three challenges for the Cooperative Promotional Model

The first challenge facing the CPM (*Epistemic Challenge)* is as follows. Recall how much information the individual has to acquire and process before taking action. She must assess: the chances of success of different (P)SMGs' project, their fit with one another, her own and others' skillsets, costs, position or influence and relevance to the aims of different (P)SMGs. She has also to adjust for the degree to which she can expect others to distribute efforts optimally. Her ability to rely on her own estimates will depend on the extent and reliability of her knowledge regarding the likely actions of others, and the degree of communication possible with others, including across (P)SMGs. The CPM does not require individuals to undertake all this no matter what the cost to herself: this would conflict with the discussion above. But there is a concern that the motivated individual may not be able to *do* anything within the limits of reasonable demandingness, because even gathering the information to decide how to act would take her beyond the limit.

A further challenge (*Conflicting Views Challenge*) results from differences of opinion within The Motivated. The discussion above not only implicitly treated the size of The Motivated as fixed (which both this and the following challenge will question): it also implicitly assumed a single scale of progress towards fair, efficient, effective action on climate change, on which all motivated individuals agree and which provides a universal measure for progress. In practice, this isn't the case. By definition, The Motivated agree on some key moral starting points: the intergenerational and global injustice of climate change threatening central human interests, and the need to respond to that (broadly speaking) fairly, efficiently and effectively. However, motivated individuals differ on *precisely* what counts as a 'fair' collective effort. Differences also result from adherence to moral values beyond the shared points above, with implications for the degree and understanding of 'efficiency' sought by individuals.

For example, some will attach moral significance to the flourishing of non-human individuals and species;[18] others attach religious significance to certain ways or life or parts of the world. These increase the likelihood of conflict between SMGs. For example, the UK's

[18] It might seem problematically anthropocentric to debate the place of non-humans or ecosystems in these determinations *purely* on the basis of individual humans happening to value them. I accept that. This paper prioritises protection of basic human interests, as an uncontroversial moral imperative. However, it is arguable that protecting non-humans from serious harm should take moral priority over some other ends acknowledged here (even, arguably, fairness). This would significantly complicate the model.

Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) supports climate action in general but opposes most tidal barrages and lagoons, as well as some windfarms, because of damage to wildlife (RSPB 2016). Some otherwise motivated individuals may in practice be *in*flexible to the point of either not being motivated to pursue collective progress on climate change if this comes at the cost of some other moral value important to them (thereby reducing the size of The Motivated), or playing 'chicken' with other SMGs by continuing to pursue one otherwise unpopular option even at the risk of undermining overall progress. This also exacerbates the *Epistemic Challenge*, since the motivated individual will have to factor all this into her reasoning even if she is not so conflicted herself.

Finally, The Motivated is only a subset of the global elite (*Challenge of the Unmotivated*). As already stressed, fulfilling one's cooperative promotional duty does *not* mean bringing about long-term global-level climate action which imposes all the burdens on The Motivated. While there is a moral case for 'taking up the slack' within the limits of demandingness (Cripps 2013: 157-60; Karnein 2014; Roser and Hohl 2011), there is an important difference between working with motivated others to get progress going and assuming that long term The Unmotivated will remain off the hook.

Recall that the morally required long-term end is fair, effective, efficient global-level climate change mitigation and adaptation. The global elite owe it to the victims of climate change to secure an *effective* end to climate injustice and to one another to do it fairly and efficiently (Cripps 2013: 143-50; Karnein 2014). Given the need for global level mitigation, it would be inefficient and very possibly ineffective to attempt to protect basic interests from climate change, long-term, without the participation of many of those currently in The Unmotivated.[19] Moreover, agents best placed to take action *and* most responsible for it would carry a lower burden than almost any reasonable conception of fairness would require (Caney 2010; Page 2012; Shue 1999).

Given this, the situation facing the motivated individual is complicated in a way which exacerbates both the previous challenges. The Motivated need to get The Unmotivated on board, whether by persuasion or institutional reform to require participation. (Both would effectively increase the size of The Motivated.) Failing that, they must find alternative ways of imposing a fair share of burdens on The Unmotivated (Caney 2016).[20] However, it will most likely be impossible to achieve full participation, or even fully fair burden-sharing. Thus, some long term slack taking will be required (within collective demandingness limits). The three ends of fairness, efficiency and effectiveness will come apart, and The Motivated must choose between them.

Now recall the *Conflicting Views Challenge*. Persuading members of The Unmotivated to join collective action, or responding adequately to the non-ideal situation wherein they remain unmotivated, may well require sacrificing other moral views, for example by damaging certain species, landscapes or ecosystems.[21] (By 'other' I mean moral views beyond the shared adherence to basic justice and some level of fairness.) The individual must also include a whole additional set of factors into her decision-making process, such as potential or skills to influence The Unmotivated. This, again, exacerbates the *Epistemic Challenge*.

[19] Stephen Gardiner (2011a: 95-98) makes this point in relation to major polluter states.

[20] Simon Caney (2016) identifies six possible responses to non-compliance with climate justice duties: increasing compliance, imposing burdens on non-compliers, sacrificing other moral ideas, reassigning responsibility, reassigning burdens to third parties, or adjusting the target (e.g. to allow a temperature rise of more than 1.5°C).

[21] The third best response to non-compliance, according to Caney (2016: 38).

Conclusions, resolutions – and a final puzzle

This chapter has outlined the CPM and explained it philosophically. It has also raised three significant challenges. Despite these, I consider the model worth preserving. This final section will briefly explain why, and acknowledge a last, related puzzle.

The *Epistemic Challenge* is not unique to the CPM. It applies to any model of moral duties requiring the agent to compare the consequences of different patterns of action in a complex scenario extending across time and space. In practice, approximation is necessary, combined with some division of labour. Individuals might begin by promoting the establishment of groups specifically tasked with comparing the effectiveness of different approaches.[22] Alternatively, they might rely on existing SMGs to do the due diligence on how they can best coordinate. Each individual could then estimate which (P)SMGs her skills best fit her for, with approximate adjustments insofar as she should reasonably be aware of wide-scale bias.[23]

Sufficient agreement is likely among those actually committed to fairness (as opposed to using the term as a cover for, say, grandfathering ambitions) for the first component of the *Conflicting Views Challenge* – differing views over fairness – not to be a limiting factor for individuals determining how to act.[24] However, the CPM needs amending in light of the second aspect of the *Conflicting Views Challenge* and the *Challenge of the Unmotivated*. As the previous section acknowledged, long-term full fairness is implausible given the attitude of at least some members of The Unmotivated. Given the different views and values upheld within The Motivated (a tension exacerbated by the need to respond to the (in)action of The Unmotivated), it is also unlikely to be optimally efficient in terms of securing basic justice.

I therefore suggest the following:

Amended Collective Promotional Duty

Act with motivated others, in so far as possible at reasonable cost to oneself, so as best to promote effective progress on global level climate change mitigation and adaptation as fairly and efficiency as feasible.

This significantly modifies the original CPD by acknowledging the fact that, in practice, The Motivated may find full fairness, efficiency and effectiveness to be incompatible. In prioritizing the former – actually avoiding severe climate harms – over fairness and efficiency, the amendment is in line with arguments made extensively elsewhere. Protecting fundamental human interests or basic rights ultimately takes priority over other (otherwise

[22] Compare the various Effective Altruist calculators available to those looking to save most lives with their charitable donations.

[23] This might seem similar to satisficing consequentialism (Hurka 1990; Rogers 2010; Slote and Pettit 1984). The CPM already advocates one aspect of satisficing insofar as it incorporates a demandingness limit, but I am not advocating satisficing in the sense of knowingly accepting a suboptimum outcome when a better one is (reasonably) within one's reach. Rather, individuals must approximate to make the fulfilment of the duty *at all* achievable within the limits of demandingness.

[24] Despite ongoing debate over details, there is general philosophical consensus that the global elite should take on the greatest burdens of mitigation and adaptation (Caney 2010; Page 2012; Shue 1999).

morally important) considerations such as fairness across duty bearers (Cripps 2013: 157-60; Roser and Hohl 2011).[25]

This amendment allows the CPM provisionally to move beyond the challenges. However, it also prompts a final philosophical dilemma which I acknowledge here but cannot fully resolve. The previous section raised the danger of conflicting moral values as though they were features of *other* motivated agents, of which the individual carrying out her calculations needed to be aware. But, in practice, almost *all* motivated persons have moral values beyond the shared commitment to protecting fundamental interests threatened by climate change. We must therefore ask how far an individual can permissibly be guided by hers in determining how she promotes mitigation and adaptation. Suppose, to use the earlier example, she is a bird lover. Can such considerations legitimately allow her to deviate from maximum efficiency, if that would dictate promoting tidal lagoons for renewable energy?

Consider three alternatives. (1) An individual's (reasonable but comprehensive) moral values should not make any difference to fulfilment of the CPD. She should act only according to justice and efficiency (her skills and the needs and salience of different (P)SMGs) in determining where to allocate her efforts. (2) The individual must not support efforts liable actively to undermine collective progress (for example, actively campaigning against an otherwise feasible approach). However, she can lend her support to a less directly related area of climate action rather than actively promote a course she deems morally wrong. For example, the bird lover might focus on adaptation aid rather than campaign against tidal lagoons. (3) An individual can campaign for the route to collective progress on climate change that she deems morally preferable (so long as it is compatible with fair collective action) right up to the point where a rival scheme is adopted by collective consent.

My own inclination is for option (2). Option (3) gives insufficient priority to protecting basic justice by permitting individuals to participate in action likely to slow progress towards it. Option (1) has the appeal of similarity to the Rawlsian requirement that the individual consider only the narrow political liberal conception of the good when acting *as a* citizen (Rawls 1993: 212-94). However, there is a distinction between being forbidden to undermine collective legislation which permits activities incompatible with one's own comprehensive values, and a moral duty to *promote* such legislation. This would arguably be too demanding, so long as there are other options collectively available which would protect the fundamental interests at stake. Suppose for the sake of argument that so-called 'sustainable intensification' were the lowest-emitting feasible food production system, given general apathy or refusal to shift away from a meat or dairy diet. Must the principled vegan actively promote this?

In practice, individuals will generally struggle to promote courses of action incompatible with their own deeply held moral values. With some exceptions, they are also likely to develop skillsets in line with their own interests. Thus, simply fulfilling the CPD as laid out would generally keep the individual's actual decisions in line with Option (1). However, this chapter does not purport to resolve this final puzzle. I highlight it as yet another outstanding question in the literature around individual climate justice duties. It is to this literature that I hope more

[25] As the previous section acknowledged, Anja Karnein (2014) rightly distinguishes the question of what duty-bearers owe to the victims of climate change (and the demandingness of those duties) from that of what duty bearers owe to one another. However, where it is not a matter of one person 'picking up the slack' by rescuing an additional victim, but of many cooperating to forge long-term collective schemes which satisfy (ideally) both duties, it is necessary to take an explicit stand on whether it is legitimate to prioritise duties to victims.

broadly to have contributed, by focusing on what the individual can achieve not in isolation but as one of a motivated set.

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